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LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT– NOT WAITING FOR SUPERMAN: COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING AS AN AFFIRMATION OF TEACHERS’ VALUE
I.

INTRODUCTION*

What exactly makes a healthy school system? Without a doubt, there
are so many nuanced factors that it’s hard to imagine a comprehensive response. But to many, collective bargaining agreements1 with teachers would
certainly not be included. The degree to which teachers and other school
employees are valued, on the other hand, is a fairly conventional factor.2
Public officials around the country purport to respect teachers by heaping
praise on the profession.3 These statements are only later contradicted by
high-profile slights4 and fraught public disputes.5 In the last decade, state
*On April 8, 2021, the Arkansas General Assembly enacted Senate Bill 341, which prohibits collective bargaining on the part of state public-sector employees, although police and
firefighters’ unions are exempted. S.B. 341, 93rd Gen. Assemb. Reg. Sess (Ark. 2021) (enacted). The bill further prohibits public employees from striking and provides that violating
this prohibition will result in termination. Ark. Code Ann. § 21-1-803(b) (West 2021). This
Note was largely drafted before S.B. 341 was enacted, and it has not been modified to reflect
this dramatic change to Arkansas public-sector labor law. Nonetheless, the argument presented is still relevant, perhaps even more so now, as it seeks to weigh the benefits of an inclusive
approach to teachers’ unions. As teachers’ unions have now been rejected entirely, perhaps
there is no better time to reflect on what this could mean for Arkansas schools.
1. Collective bargaining is the process of an employer’s negotiating the terms and
conditions of employment with employees who are represented by an exclusive agent, typically a union. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (“For the purposes of this section, to bargain collectively is
the performance of the mutual obligation of the employer and the representative of the employees to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and
other terms and conditions of employment[.]”).
2. See Katie Glueck, Joe Biden Debuts Education Plan, Then Touts It to Teachers’
Union, N.Y. TIMES (May 28, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/28/us/politics/bideneducation-plan-2020.html (quoting President Joe Biden stressing the importance of “increas[ing] the dignity of work” of teachers and the “professionalization of how [teachers are]
treated” to his education platform).
3. See, e.g., Secretary of Education Betsy DeVos (@BetsyDeVos), TWITTER (May 5,
2019, 6:00 PM), https://twitter.com/BetsyDeVosED/status/1125173328086433792?ref_src=
twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E1125173328086433792%7Ctwgr
%5E%7Ctwcon%5Es1_&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.yahoo.com%2Flifestyle%2Fteach
ers-respond-to-betsy-de-vos-praise-for-national-teacher-appreciation-week-humbly-ask-for-araise-and-your-resignation-215007252.html.
4. See, e.g., Cal Thomas, Interview of Secretary of Education Betsy DeVos, TOWNHALL
(Feb. 16, 2017, 12:00 AM), https://townhall.com/columnists/calthomas/2017/02/16/
interview-of-secretary-of-education-betsy-devos-n2286164 (quoting Devos, who referred to
teachers at the school she was visiting as being in “receive mode”).
5. See infra Section II.B.
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legislators around the country have conducted a relentless campaign to suppress the collective bargaining power of educators in public school systems.6
This begs the question, how can political leaders logically praise teachers
while simultaneously striving to dismantle their most influential platform?
The Little Rock School District (LRSD) exemplifies this dichotomous
relationship between teachers and school management.7 On December 12,
2019, the Arkansas State Board of Education (“State Board”) elected to reconstitute the school district after almost five years of unilateral state control
and dissolution of the local school board.8 This development could have
brought a sense of finality to the controversial “takeover” by the state. Instead, the State Board implemented three restrictions that will indefinitely
prolong its oversight.9 Although the LRSD has returned to local control following the November 3, 2020 general election of a local school board (“Local Board”), the Local Board is prohibited from (1) changing the superintendent, (2) recognizing any collective bargaining agent, and (3) instituting
any non-routine litigation without approval from the State Board.10 The
State Board’s action is of particular note because, prior to the Little Rock
Education Association’s (LREA) contract expiring on October 31, 2019, the
LRSD was the lone school district in Arkansas where the local teachers’
union held bargaining power.11
The State Board’s decision has only intensified widespread criticisms
that it is not responding to the communities zoned for the LRSD, but is rather pursuing its partisan agenda of introducing market principles into public
education.12 Supporters of the decision, on the other hand, posit that a grad6. See David J. Strom & Stephanie S. Baxter, From the Statehouse to the Schoolhouse:
How Legislatures and Courts Shaped Labor Relations for Public Education Employees During the Last Decade, 30 J. L. & EDUC. 275 (2001); Martin H. Malin, The Legislative Upheaval in Public-Sector Labor Law: A Search for Common Elements, 27 ABA J. LAB. & EMP. L.
149 (2012).
7. For the purposes of this Note, I define “school management” broadly. I am generally
referring to the bodies that control the funding and policies of a given school district, such as
a school board or executive agency. However, the phrase may also encompass management
at an individual school—principals, or even state legislatures that, while not directly involved
in administering routine operations, enact school reform laws.
8. Cynthia Howell, Arkansas Board of Education Approves Reconstitution Plan for
Little Rock Schools, ARK. DEMOCRAT GAZETTE (Dec. 12, 2019, 8:39 PM),
https://www.arkansasonline.com/news/2019/dec/12/arkansas-board-education-approvesreconstitution-p/.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Madeline Will, In Little Rock, Ark., Teachers to Strike for Collective Bargaining
Power, EDUC. WEEK (Nov. 13, 2019), https://www.edweek.org/teaching-learning/in-littlerock-ark-teachers-to-strike-for-collective-bargaining-power/2019/11.
12. See, e.g., Lindsey Millar, Five Years of State Control of the LRSD, ARK. TIMES (Jan.
28, 2020, 2:10 PM), https://arktimes.com/arkansas-blog/2020/01/28/five-years-of-statecontrol-of-the-lrsd?pico_new_user=true&pico_ui=login_link (criticizing the “dubious legal
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ual return to local control is necessary to avoid returning to the same patterns of underperformance and mismanagement that prompted the state
takeover in the first place.13
State takeovers implemented by political leaders have become a commonplace tactic adopted to bypass teachers’ union influence and ease the
implementation of reform measures.14 Local districts, too, are often at odds
with teachers’ unions when enacting policies.15 This sort of adversarial relationship between school management and teachers’ unions is on display
nationwide and has frequently entered the political fray.16 It reflects a common sentiment that has taken root in the past decade: that teachers’ unions
are a burdensome, pestilent roadblock to substantive reforms.17 Collective
bargaining is often depicted as a means for teachers’ unions to exercise outsized influence in local policy decisions and another bureaucratic cog that
eliminates managerial discretion while rewarding poor performers.18
Inevitably, education policy has important implications for educators’
work settings and expectations.19 For example, policies relating to class size,
the academic calendar, teacher evaluation, and curriculum directly affect the
classroom. Collective bargaining is a mechanism that shields union memopinion by education department lawyers” allowing for only limited return to local control of
the school district). This article is critical of state management of the district, accusing Education Secretary Johnny Key of making important decisions on a “purely political” basis and
lamenting the dramatic expansion of charter schools operating in the LRSD while it remained
under state control. Id.
13. Johnny Key, The LRSD Reconstitution Framework is a Responsible Path Forward,
ARK. TALK BUS. & POL. (Oct. 6, 2019, 6:04 PM), https://talkbusiness.net/2019/10/the-lrsdreconstitution-framework-is-a-responsible-path-forward/.
14. See, e.g., Andre Ujifusa, Rhode Island the Latest State to Plan a District Intervention, EDUC. WEEK (Aug. 21, 2019), https://www.edweek.org/policy-politics/rhode-island-thelatest-state-to-plan-a-district-intervention/2019/08.
15. See, e.g., Tiffany Lankes, Buffalo Teachers Federation Sues Over Superintendent’s
Takeover of 20 Schools, THE BUFFALO NEWS (Jan. 30, 2021), https://buffalonews.com/
news/local/crime-and-courts/buffalo-teachers-federation-sues-over-superintendent-stakeover-of-20-schools/article_1c7056a1-40c4-5a55-bb05-5bf524f60300.html.
16. See, e.g., Scott Walker, Why I’m Fighting in Wisconsin, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 10, 2011,
12:01 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142405274870413220457619026078780
5984 (reporting on former Wisconsin Governor Scott Walker’s stance against teachers unions, which received nationwide media coverage after he effectively abolished collective
bargaining with most public employees, briefly thrusting him into the political spotlight as a
leading presidential candidate in 2016); see Molly Ball, How Scott Walker’s Hubris Killed
His Campaign, ATLANTIC (Sept. 22, 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/
2015/09/scott-walker-presidential-campaign/406618/archive/2015/09/scott-walkerpresidential-campaign/406618/ (“[Walker’s] battles with public-sector unions had impressed
national conservatives.”).
17. See Nicholas Dagostino, Note, Giving the School Bully a Timeout: Protecting Urban
Students from Teachers’ Unions, 63 ALA. L. REV. 177, 198 (2011).
18. Id. at 181–84.
19. See infra Section II.A.

312

UA LITTLE ROCK LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44

bers from the impact of adverse management decisions, such as substituting
time dedicated to lesson planning with morning and lunch duty. And in the
right setting, collective bargaining can promote positive education reform
through labor-management cooperation.20 At the very least, recognition of
teachers’ unions as collective bargaining agents validates the voices of educators who have a limited policy platform despite being the most in tune
with educational policy’s target—the classroom. The common criticisms of
teachers’ unions are misguided. Unions function as obstacles to education
reform because their membership is vulnerable to reform efforts that exclude teachers from the decision-making process. Consequently, unions focus strictly on shielding teachers from unilateral decisions by management.
The legislature’s efforts to mitigate union influence pigeonhole them into an
obstructionist role. This pattern warrants renewed efforts for union inclusion. However, there are two sides to this coin. Union inclusion also demands that unions be more genuinely altruistic when advocating for teacher
interests.
Collective bargaining in itself does not subvert school district health
but rather has the potential to foster a collaborative relationship between
management and educators. This Note argues that the LRSD and the LREA
should negotiate by incrementally integrating those “management” decisions
that directly affect the teacher-school district employment relationship into
the scope of bargaining. In order to do this, Arkansas must adopt a statutory
framework that fosters labor-management cooperation. Shifting from the
current trend of suppressing union engagement towards labor-management
cooperation would elevate the teaching profession, thereby grounding the
rhetorical value heaped on teachers in policy.21
Section II of this Note presents an overview of collective bargaining
law for teachers and state efforts to reform it.22 Section III presents the state
of that law in Arkansas.23 Section IV scrutinizes the compatibility of teach20. See Martin H. Malin, Education Reform and Labor-Management Cooperation: What
Role for the Law?, 45 U. TOL. L. REV. 527, 531–34 (2014) (discussing the impact of unionled peer review as an alternative to traditional teacher evaluation systems, in addition to collaborative efforts by the teachers’ union and management to select textbooks, develop curriculum, and monitor and implement school improvement plans, on the Toledo City School
District). Labor-management collaboration is also applauded for creative approaches in turning around failing school districts in Providence, Rhode Island; Evansville, Indiana; and New
Haven, Connecticut. Id. at 533.
21. This policy proposal is largely the product of a value judgment about the proper
allocation of power among teachers and administrators; however, adopting it will demonstrate that teachers are professionals and not unskilled labor, and it is only the logical outgrowth of a public sentiment that respects the unique societal role held by teaching professionals.
22. See infra Section II.
23. See infra Section III.
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ers’ union’s employment interests and the public’s interest in improving
school performance and argues that the two align on many fronts.24 Section
V critiques the Arkansas State Board of Education’s reconstitution scheme
and offers an alternative policy direction, namely adopting a legal framework that encourages professional unionism and cooperation between teachers’ unions and school district management.25
II.

COLLECTIVE BARGAINING OVERVIEW

Teachers’ unions are among the most influential labor bodies in the
country.26 It appears unlikely that this will change in the near future,27 despite the Supreme Court’s recent decision that it is unconstitutional for unions to compel dues from eligible members in districts where the union is
the elected representative.28 Unions have a variety of tools they may use to
influence policy issues.29 But collective bargaining is the unions’ most tangible means of making a policy impact because these agreements limit
school management, typically a school board and its administrators, contractually by confining the scope of management’s discretionary authority.30
Teachers’ unions were born out of a desire to confront a history of
marginalization and create a formidable position to negotiate working conditions and compensation with management.31 Naturally, organizers were inclined to adopt the same proven collective bargaining model used in the

24. See infra Section IV.
25. See infra Section V.
26. See Labor, OPENSECRETS CTR. FOR RESPONSIVE POL., https://www.opensecrets.org/
industries/indus.php?ind=P (last visited Feb. 2, 2021).
27. See Larry Ferlazzo, Response: Teachers Unions ‘Must Claim the Mantle of Educational Leadership’, EDUC. WEEK (Mar. 10, 2018), https://www.edweek.org/education/
opinion-response-teachers-unions-must-claim-the-mantle-of-educational-leadership/
2018/03 (discussing the future of teachers’ unions).
28. Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cnty., & Mun. Emps. Council 31, 138 U.S. 2448, 2486
(2018) (holding that union security agreements, which compel union membership or union
fees for all employees governed by a collective bargaining agreement, are not authorized in
the public sector as they constitute a violation of the First Amendment right to free speech).
29. Teachers’ unions spend heavily on advertisements and lobbying, for example. See
Soloman Moore & Harriet B. Rowan, COVID’S political impact: teachers union outspends
Big
Oil
in
Sacramento,
THE
MERCURY
NEWS
(May
16,
2021),
https://www.mercurynews.com/2021/05/16/covids-political-impact-teachers-unionoutspends-big-oil-in-sacramento/ (last visited Nov. 1, 2021).
30. See infra Section II.B (discussing the importance and scope of collective bargaining
agreements with teachers’ unions).
31. See generally, Adam Mertz, A Century of Teacher Organizing: What Can We
Learn?, THE LABOR AND WORKING CLASS HISTORY ASS’N., https://www.lawcha.org/centuryteaching-organizing/ (last visited Nov. 1, 2021) (discussing the history of teachers’ unions’
evolution from the late 19th century to present).
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industrial sector.32 Under this adversarial “industrial labor relations” model,
employees leverage their collective ability to halt standardized work outputs
via the threat of striking to secure commitments from management.33 While
this model has been a resounding success in securing improved pay, benefits, and job security for school employees, it is flawed. Teachers and administrators, supposed partners in the educational enterprise, are often pitted
against one another in negotiations, invariably resulting in a zero-sum outcome. This Section provides an overview of the collective bargaining process and places the policy proposals advocated for in this Note in the proper
legal and political context.
A.

The Scope of Bargaining

Public-sector labor law generally reaffirms the notion of teaching as
industrial labor by excluding certain managerial matters from the scope of
bargaining, thereby limiting labor influence on those matters.34 Not all states
authorize collective bargaining by public employees, however.35 The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA),36 which grants employees the right to
engage or refrain from union activity, does not apply to federal, state, or
local government employers.37 While the First Amendment guarantees a
right to unionize and participate in most union activities, it does not require
school management to recognize or bargain with unions.38 Thus, states are

32. See generally, David M. Rabban, Can American Labor Law Accommodate Collective Bargaining by Professional Employees?, 99 YALE L.J. 689, 691–94 (1990) (discussing
the historical roots of collective bargaining law in the industrial labor movement).
33. Id.
34. Benjamin M. Superfine & Jessica J. Gottlieb, Teacher Evaluation and Collective
Bargaining: The New Frontier of Civil Rights, 2014 MICH. ST. L. REV. 737, 742–43 (2014).
35. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 95–98 (“Any . . . contract[] between the governing
authority of any . . . institution of the State of North Carolina, and any labor union . . . as
bargaining agent for any public employees . . . is hereby declared to be against the public
policy of the State, illegal, unlawful, void and of no effect.”); TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. §
617.002(a) (“An official of the state . . . may not enter into a collective bargaining contract
with a labor organization regarding wages, hours, or conditions of employment of public
employees.”).
36. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–69.
37. 29 U.S.C. § 152(2).
38. Am. Fed’n of State, Cnty., & Mun. Emps., AFL-CIO v. Woodward, 406 F.2d 137,
139 (8th Cir. 1969) (quoting Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483 (1965) (“The First
Amendment protects the right of one citizen to associate with other citizens for any lawful
purpose free from government interference. The guarantee of the ‘right of assembly’ protects
more than ‘the right to attend a meeting; it includes the right to express one’s attitudes or
philosophies by membership in a group or by affiliation with it or by other lawful means.’”).
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permitted to craft their own statutory framework pertaining to public sector
collective bargaining agents, which they began to implement in the 1960s.39
Some states have passed legislation prohibiting public entities from
recognizing collective bargaining agents entirely.40 This is not standard policy. The majority of states explicitly permit collective bargaining for teachers
and require school districts to recognize a teachers’ union, elected by a majority of eligible district employees, to be their authorized agent.41 “Permissive” states, on the other hand, delegate school districts the discretionary
authority to engage in collective bargaining.42
In states where public-sector collective bargaining is authorized, the
range of issues on the table for negotiation, the “scope of bargaining,” varies. Often, the legislature authorizes bargaining for “terms and conditions of
employment” while expressly limiting that term of art from the NLRA,
committing certain matters to the discretion of the employer.43 Inevitably,
the statutory language does not encompass all potential points of dispute,
and courts or administrative bodies must discern whether particular issues
are mandatory, permissible, or altogether excluded from the scope of bargaining.44 Pensions, wages, hours, benefits, and dismissal procedures are
almost invariably considered terms and conditions of employment.45 Managerial or administrative matters, such as the length of the school day and
year, transfer procedures, class size, teacher evaluations, student discipline,

39. Chris Edwards, Public-Sector Unions, 61 CATO INST. TAX & BUDGET BULLETIN
(Mar. 2010), http://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/tbb_61.pdf (“Princeton University’s Henry Farber has documented the rise in public-sector unionism since the 1950s. He
found that the number of states allowing collective bargaining for public-sector workers
jumped from just one in 1955 to 10 by 1965. New York City granted collective bargaining
privileges to most city workers in 1958. By 1970, about half of the nation’s state-level workers had collective-bargaining privileges, while more than half of the states allowed collective
bargaining in local governments.”).
40. Benjamin A. Lindy, The Impact of Teacher Collective Bargaining Laws on Student
Achievement: Evidence from a New Mexico Natural Experiment, 120 YALE L.J. 1130, 1137
(2011).
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 1144 n.71.
44. See, e.g., In re Bd. of Educ. of City Sch. Dist. of City of New York v. New York
State Pub. Empl. Rels. Bd., 554 N.E.2d 1247, 1251 (N.Y. 1990) (reviewing determination of
Public Employment Retirement Board and holding that teacher disclosure requirements were
mandatory, not permissive subject of bargaining); Teaneck Bd. of Educ. v. Teaneck Teachers
Ass’n, 462 A.2d 137, 140–41 (1983) (contemplating an employer’s discretion to hire, retain,
promote, transfer, or dismiss employees); W. Cent. Educ. Ass’n v. W. Cent. Sch. Dist. 49-4,
655 N.W.2d 916, 917 (2002) (contemplating changes in school calendars); City of Pittsburgh
v. Com., Pennsylvania Lab. Rels. Bd., 653 A.2d 1210 (1995) (contemplating pension plans).
45. Superfine & Gottlieb, supra note 34, at 769–70.
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professional development, are more contentious if not explicitly referenced.46
Negotiations often sour when there is a dispute regarding whether a
matter is appropriately considered a term or condition of employment.47 Because it is difficult to define the scope of bargaining with precision and certainty at the outset, these disputes are often resolved through litigation.48 The
outcomes of these disputes often directly impact educational policy, such as
where the disputed matter is defining educational objectives or textbook
selection.49 Therefore, legislation will frequently include limiting language
in a management rights provision recognizing the importance of managerial
prerogatives and affording school administrators deference in implementing
these prerogatives without union interference.50
When interpreting the scope of bargaining, administrative bodies and
the courts will often apply a balancing test that weighs “whether a particular
decision is primarily related to the wages, hours, and conditions of employment of the employees, or whether it is primarily related to the formulation
or management of public policy.”51 This decision may be imbued with value
judgments on the proper role of labor and management.52 Further, these decisions are very contentious because each matter may reflect a policy choice
and be politicized. The Court of Appeals of Maryland aptly reflected on this
dilemma when it stated, “[E]very managerial decision in some way relates
to ‘salaries, wages, hours, and other working conditions,’ and is therefore
arguably negotiable. At the same time, virtually every such decision also
involves educational policy considerations and is therefore arguably nonnegotiable.”53
Determining what exactly is on the table for negotiation fundamentally
shapes the relationship between teachers’ unions and their affiliated school
district. Unions may be completely excluded from non-mandatory matters

46. Id. at 769.
47. See Martin H. Malin & Charles Taylor Kerchner, Charter Schools and Collective
Bargaining: Compatible Marriage or Illegitimate Relationship?, 30 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
885, 915–18 (2007).
48. Id. at 914.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 913.
51. See, e.g., Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 of Racine Cty. v. Wis. Emp. Rls. Comm’n, 259
N.W.2d 724, 731–32 (Wis. 1977).
52. See Waterloo Educ. Ass’n v. Iowa Pub. Emp. Rels. Bd., 740 N.W.2d 418, 424 (Iowa
2007) (“[T]he ill-defined nature of balancing tests in general gives rise to the possibility that
invisible, unconscious, but perhaps inevitable judicial bias could creep into the decisionmaking process.”).
53. Montgomery Cty. Educ. Ass’n Inc. v. Bd. Of Educ. of Montgomery Cty., 534 A.2d
980, 986 (Md. 1987).
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and denied information pertaining to those subjects.54 In fact, this is frequently the case. A 2012 Gallup survey reported that K-12 teachers were the
least likely of twelve different occupations to agree that, “At work, my opinions seem to count.”55 This dim outlook has negative repercussions, with
seventy percent of teachers not feeling engaged at work.56
Reformers concerned with professional detachment argue that excluding unions only encourages union leadership to prioritize protecting members from the consequences of unilateral decisions by management, prompting power struggles between union leadership and administrators.57 The industrial relations model fosters this sort of in-fighting and creates an obstructionist environment. In this environment, unions focus on defending
themselves against actions by schools and districts that adversely affect the
“bread and butter” issues concerning terms and conditions of employment
without emphasizing policy objectives.58 Therefore, teachers’ union’s objectives are typically confined to employment interests rather than general education policy objectives and concern for students, although union leadership
certainly attempts to pair the two together when garnering public support.59
B.

The Political Landscape

Due to unions’ circumscribed role and strong support among teachers,
they have been largely successful in achieving security in the workplace.60
Many collective bargaining agreements duplicate statutes governing the
process by which teachers are evaluated, disciplined, and fired, posing an
additional due process barrier before removal.61 Employment perks, such as
voluntary transfer, are prioritized based on seniority rather than qualifications or administrative discretion.62 Unions have scored major victories
54. See, e.g., Vill. of Franklin Park v. Ill. State Lab. Rels. Bd., 638 N.E.2d 1144, 1148–
49 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994) (holding that the employer was not compelled to produce information
on a non-mandatory subject of bargaining).
55. Gallup, State of America’s Schools: The Path to Winning Again in Education 29
(2014).
56. Id. at 26.
57. Malin, supra note 20, at 537 (demonstrating the power struggles that occurred
through drawn out litigation prompted by the teacher’s union in Racine, Wisconsin after the
school district unilaterally decided to experiment with a year-round schedule).
58. See Malin & Kerchner, supra note 47, at 921.
59. See infra Section III.
60. See Dagostino, supra note 17, at 191–98 (discussing union input on teacher tenure,
teacher evaluation, and layoff protections that provide a buffer to discretionary employment
decisions by management).
61. William S. Koski, Teacher Collective Bargaining, Teacher Quality, and the Teacher
Quality Gap: Toward a Policy Analytic Framework, 6 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 67, 73–74
(2012).
62. Id. at 75.
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through political influence by introducing many other permissive subjects
into the scope of bargaining.63
Union opponents attempt to peg the failure of schools on these sorts of
protections afforded teachers, prompting efforts to restrict bargaining rights
and advocate for altering employment protections such as tenure.64 Recent
history illustrates that this sentiment is gaining momentum. The 1990s saw a
considerable legislative backlash against collective bargaining rights.65 The
following decade saw sizeable gains by teachers.66 But the 2010 elections
brought a renewed sense of hostility towards teachers’ unions.67 The following Section is an overview of state legislators’ recent efforts to reign in the
impact of collective bargaining through teachers’ unions.
1.

Repealing the Right to Bargain

In 2011, Oklahoma repealed provisions protecting public employees’
collective bargaining rights so that collective bargaining was no longer
mandatory but rather up to school districts’ discretion.68 Shortly afterward,
in 2018, teachers underwent a historic strike seeking to secure both increased salaries, which were at the time the lowest in the country, and funding for schools generally.69 An Oklahoma representative responded by intro63. See Malin, supra note 6, at 151–53 (noting efforts in Michigan, Oregon, Wisconsin,
Ohio, New Mexico, Pennsylvania, and Chicago to restrict previously negotiable items in the
scope of bargaining).
64. See, e.g., Dagostino, supra note 17, at 180.
65. Malin, supra note 6, at 150–51.
66. Id. at 151–52. (“Illinois amended the Chicago School Reform Act to change the
prohibited subjects of bargaining to permissive subjects. Illinois also imposed first-contract
interest arbitration for bargaining units of thirty-five or fewer employees. Wisconsin repealed
the QEO, granted collective bargaining rights to state university faculty and research assistants, made teacher preparation time and changes to teacher evaluation plans mandatory
subjects of bargaining, and mandated that grievance arbitration continue during contract
hiatus periods. Illinois, New Jersey, Oregon, New Hampshire, California, and Massachusetts
mandated ‘card check’ recognition. Numerous states extended collective bargaining rights to
home health care aides and in-home daycare providers by designating the state as employer
of record for collective bargaining purposes; otherwise, they would be considered independent contractors. In 2003, New Mexico enacted a public employee collective bargaining statute
that was stronger than the one that had sunset four years earlier. In 2004, Oklahoma extended
collective bargaining rights to employees of municipalities with populations of 35,000 or
more.”).
67. Id.
68. Evan McMorris-Santoro, Unions Lose One in Oklahoma, TALKING POINTS MEMO
(Apr. 20, 2011, 1:20 PM), https://talkingpointsmemo.com/dc/unions-lose-one-in-oklahoma.
69. Andrea DenHoed, Striking Oklahoma Teachers Win Historic School-Funding Increase and Keep on Marching, THE NEW YORKER (Apr. 4, 2018),
https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/striking-oklahoma-teachers-win-historicschool-funding-increase-and-keep-on-marching.
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ducing House Bill 2214, which not only proposed making it illegal for
school district employees to strike, but also would have denied pay to employees who violated the prohibition.70 The bill died in committee.71
The same year that Oklahoma revoked mandatory bargaining, the Tennessee legislature repealed the Education Professional Negotiations Act,
which guaranteed the right to collectively bargain, replacing it with the Professional Educators Collaborative Conferencing providing procedures for
“collaborative conferencing.”72 This repeal was a more moderate approach
that still sought to give groups representing teachers a seat at the table. Under this negotiation scheme, teacher representatives that are supported by at
least fifteen percent of employees may confer with the school board after an
initial petition for collaborative conferencing.73 However, the scope of conferencing is limited to salaries, grievance procedures, insurance, and fringe
benefits and excludes items relating to working conditions, such as school
placements and teacher evaluations.74 Even matters relating to compensation, such as differential pay plans and incentive compensation, are off the
table.75 The new scheme also watered down teacher influence because management can simply ignore teacher input and unilaterally make decisions.76
The restrictive Oklahoma legislation ultimately resulted in a strike seven years after it repealed the right to bargain.77 The changes in this legislation did not ease educational reform efforts but rather antagonized the teachers’ unions.78 The unions focused their efforts on organizing to strike rather
than collaborating with school district management.79 Ultimately, repealing
the right to bargain only worsened the relationship between labor and management.80 Meanwhile, Tennessee implemented a more collaborative approach that eliminated the bargaining monopoly afforded to teachers’ unions
70. See Andrea Eger, Political Payback for the Statewide Teacher Walkout? Slew of
Newly Filed Bills Aim to Punish, Limit Future Protests, TULSA WORLD (Aug. 31, 2019),
https://tulsaworld.com/homepagelatest/political-payback-for-the-statewide-teacher-walkoutslew-of-newly/article_55ab887d-d669-50cc-8dff-ca5af283d23e.html; H.B. 2214, 57th Gen.
Assemb. Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2019) (introduced Jan. 17, 2019; failed).
71. About 2,000 Measures Died in the Oklahoma Legislature. What’s Still Alive This
Session?, TULSA WORLD (Mar. 17, 2019), https://tulsaworld.com/news/state-andregional/about-2-000-measures-died-in-the-oklahoma-legislature-whats-still-alive-thissession/collection2b21c25f-c116-590c-9e6c-25ab43ade0cd.html#1.
72. 2011 Tenn. Pub. Acts 378 (codified at TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-5-601(a) (West
2021)).
73. TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-5-605(b)(1) (West 2021).
74. Id. § 49-5-608(a)–(b).
75. Id. § 49-5-608(b)(1).
76. See id. § 49-5-609(d).
77. DenHoed, supra note 69.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
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as the sole representative of school district employees.81 While the law did
target teachers’ unions in this sense, teachers’ unions were not entirely excluded and were welcome to participate in collaborative conferencing along
with other groups that met the threshold level of support.82 This nonexclusionary approach did not result in the same fallout as in Oklahoma.
The divergent outcomes in these recent efforts to repeal collective bargaining in school systems demonstrate the importance of labor inclusion in the
decision-making process.
2.

Restricting the Scope of Bargaining

The most common changes in the relationship between administration
and unions concern the scope of bargaining. Legislators have endeavored to
remove both “bread and butter” issues, such as health care and those more
closely related to working conditions, from the bargaining table.83 This
agenda is typically associated with efforts to cut costs.84
In 2011, Ohio enacted Senate Bill 5, which removed health care, sick
time, and pension benefits from the scope of bargaining.85 This cost-saving
measure would have made employees responsible for at least fifteen percent
of employee health care costs while banning strikes and shifting towards
performance-based pay.86 However, the bill was repealed that same year
after an aggressive campaign to introduce a popular referendum that easily
passed by a twenty-two-point margin.87
Similar efforts were simultaneously underway in Wisconsin with the
nationally politicized Act 10, which passed on March 11, 2011.88 This bill
limited collective bargaining agents to negotiations over base wages while
mandating that employees contribute to their pensions and health care premiums.89 More recently, the Iowa Legislature rewrote the state’s collective
bargaining law to limit bargaining over health insurance, holidays, and over-

81. TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-5-601 (West 2021).
82. Id.
83. Malin & Kerchner, supra note 47, at 918–21.
84. Id.
85. S.B. 5, 129th Gen. Assemb. (Ohio 2011– 2012) (enacted); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
4117 (repealed 2011).
86. The Associated Press, Ohio Moves to Restrict Collective Bargaining, EDUC. WEEK
(Apr. 5, 2011), https://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/2011/04/06/27brief-b2.h30.html.
87. Jim Provance, Kasich Accepts Defeat of Issue 2, THE BLADE (Nov. 9, 2011, 8:47
AM), https://www.toledoblade.com/local/politics/2011/11/08/Issue-2/stories/20111108101.
88. Amy Merrick, Wisconsin Union Law to Take Effect, WALL ST. J. (June 15, 2011),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303848104576386122936205978.
89. Id.
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time to unions where thirty percent of membership work in a public-safety
capacity.90
The common themes in these disputes are the negative press and animosity they generate. Given the adversarial nature of any collective bargaining dispute, one side is left resenting the other due to lost leverage. This is
not productive and inhibits meaningful reform. The partisan nature of labormanagement disputes distracts from the substantive policy targeting classrooms.
Efforts to restrict the scope of bargaining, though less heavy-handed
than altogether eliminating the right to collectively bargain, similarly reflect
an anti-union sentiment. This sentiment has taken root in Arkansas among
state officials. Before the Arkansas legislature advances its anti-union agenda further by restricting the permissible scope of bargaining or repealing
public-sector collective bargaining altogether, it must reexamine the industrial-labor relations paradigm that defines the LRSD-LREA relationship.91
III.

COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN ARKANSAS AND THE LITTLE ROCK
SCHOOL DISTRICT

Arkansas is a “right-to-work” state, meaning that all labor unions, organized and independent, while categorically protected, are prohibited from
compelling membership among the employee pool it represents.92 While
most states require schools to bargain over the “terms and conditions of employment[,]”93 Arkansas has traditionally allowed school districts to choose
whether to recognize unions and engage in collective bargaining.94 Any
agreement between a school district and the union would preempt state education personnel policies.95 Further, school districts were prohibited from
“tak[ing] or threaten[ing] actions which interfere with, restrain, or coerce a
90. See Shelby Fleig & Robin Opsahl, In a Victory for Republicans, Iowa Supreme
Court Upholds 2017 Law Limiting Public-Worker Unions’ Rights, DES MOINES REGISTER
(May 19, 2019, 8:03 AM), https://www.desmoinesregister.com/story/news/crime-andcourts/2019/05/17/collective-bargaining-iowa-legislature-afscme-61-kim-reynolds-supremecourt-unions/3705134002/.
91. See infra, Section V.
92. ARK. CODE ANN. § 11-3-301 (2021) (“Freedom of organized labor to bargain collectively and freedom of unorganized labor to bargain individually is declared to be the public
policy of the state under Arkansas Constitution, Amendment 34.”).
93. Lindy, supra note 40, at 1183. “Terms and conditions of employment” is a term of
art developed from the NLRA. 29 U.S.C. § 151.
94. See Act of April 18, 2001, ch. 6, 1765 Ark. Laws 979 (codified at ARK. CODE ANN. §
6-17-202) (excluding school districts that “choose[ ] to officially recognize in its policies an
organization representing the majority of the teachers of the school district for the purpose of
negotiating personnel policies, salaries, and educational matters of mutual concern under a
written policy agreement” from state education personnel policies).
95. See id.
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teacher in the exercise of the teacher’s right to have an organization represent a majority of the teachers.”96
The Arkansas General Assembly attempted to reign in the LREA, the
collective bargaining agent for the LRSD, in 2019. In this sense, the LRSD
and its relationship with the LREA has been a microcosm of the national
trend of suppressing teachers’ unions. Recent developments began with the
“state takeover” of the LRSD in 2015 that occurred after the LRSD failed to
meet performance standards and was classified as in need of “Level 5—
Intensive Support.”97 The state placed control of the district in the hands of
the State Board, which supplanted the democratically-elected school board.98
This takeover gave the State Board the purported authority to implement
several measures suppressing union influence.
In an effort to improve teacher quality in low-performing schools, the
State Board waived the Arkansas Teacher Fair Dismissal Act of 2018 in the
face of significant opposition.99 This law provides statutory due process protections to teachers statewide, including strict evaluation and counseling
procedures that management must follow before firing a teacher for performance-based reasons.100 The waiver was originally intended to be selectively applied to schools that scored a “D” or “F” on the district’s accountability
metric.101 Still, a State Board member asked District Superintendent Michael
Poore in the hearing if he needed a “hatchet in his tool belt” to assist in firing staff rather than a “scalpel.”102
Teachers resisted the decision, citing concerns that they would not receive a fair hearing prior to any adverse decisions.103 However, the LREA
96. Id.
97. ARK. CODE ANN. § 6-15-2916 (2021) (granting the Department of Education the
power to take over the elected school board).
98. The authority of the State of Arkansas to take over democratically elected school
boards stems from a landmark Arkansas Supreme Court decision holding that the State’s
constitution mandates that school funding and performance be adequate and equitable. Lake
View Sch. Dist. No. 25 of Phillips Cty., Ark. v. Huckabee, 362 Ark. 520, 526, 210 S.W.3d
28, 32 (2005). The court’s decision delegated oversight of this constitutional mandate from
local school districts and school boards to the State. Id. The State Board now reserves the
authority to take control of districts that are in need of “Level 5 Intensive Support.” ARK.
CODE ANN. § 6-15-2916(2)(B)(iii) (West 2021).
99. See Benjamin Hardy, After State Waives Due Process Protections for LR Teachers,
Poore Promises Fairness and Caution, ARK. TIMES (Dec. 21, 2018, 4:19 am),
https://arktimes.com/arkansas-blog/2018/12/21/after-state-waives-due-process-protectionsfor-lr-teachers-poore-promises-fairness-and-caution.
100. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 6-17-1501–1510.
101. See Hardy, supra note 99.
102. See Lindsey Millar, Update: State Board Approves Waiver of Teacher Fair Dismissal Law in the LRSD, Denies Most Other Proposals, ARK. TIMES (Dec. 21, 2018, 2:30 AM),
https://arktimes.com/arkansas-blog/2018/12/21/update-state-board-approves-waiver-ofteacher-fair-dismissal-law-in-the-lrsd-denies-most-other-proposals.
103. Hardy, supra note 99.
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found solace in the grievance process contained in its collective bargaining
agreement.104 Without this procedural backstop, there would have been little
recourse for teachers fired indiscriminately.
The following year, the State Board unanimously decided to oust the
LREA as teachers’ representative by refusing to contract with any teachers’
group that mandated collective bargaining.105 As a consolation, the State
Board revoked the Teacher Fair Dismissal Act waiver, and reinstated the
Act’s procedural safeguards afforded to teachers facing dismissal106 The
decision to oust the teachers’ union, despite seventy percent of teachers supporting union representation, resulted in a one-day strike, reflecting the
common sentiment that the “[State Board] thinks it knows better than teachers.”107
Personnel Policy Committees (PPC) became the default model for employee representation.108 The personnel committees, composed of at least
five classroom teachers and no more than three administrators for each
school district,109 are a watered-down model of employee representation.
The committees are structured to review school district personnel policies
and propose amendments or new policies altogether to the local school
board.110 All policies that pertain to the “terms and conditions of a teacher’s
employment” are on the table.111 These terms and conditions explicitly include benefits, compensation, designation of workdays, holidays, the annual
calendar, teacher evaluations, extra duties, leave, grievances, dismissal or
nonrenewal, reduction in force, and assignment of teacher aides.112 However, the list is not exhaustive.113 The language regarding what the committee
may consider mirrors that of many collective bargaining agreements.114 But
the committees do not have the same binding power as collective bargaining
agreements.

104. Id.
105. See Lindsey Millar, The Second Little Rock Crisis, ARK. TIMES (Oct. 28, 2019, 5:57
PM), https://arktimes.com/news/cover-stories/2019/10/28/the-second-little-rock-crisis.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. See Cynthia Howell, Local Control of Little Rock District OK’d Under Revised
Plan; Board Riles Teachers on Collective Bargaining, ARK. DEMOCRAT GAZETTE (Oct. 11,
2019, 7:25 AM), https://www.arkansasonline.com/news/2019/oct/11/local-control-of-lrsd-okd-under-revise/?news. The State Board reasoned that Personnel Policy Committees negated
the need for union representation. Id.
109. ARK. CODE ANN. § 6-17-203(a) (West 2021).
110. Id. § 6-17-205(b).
111. Id. § 6-17-201(b).
112. Id. § 6-17-201(c).
113. Id.
114. See supra Section II.A.
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Committee proposals are subject to the discretion of school management who may simply reject proposed policies or amendments,115 unlike the
contractual provisions in a collective bargaining agreement. Teachers composing the personnel committees lack expertise in drafting budgets, policy,
and the law that union leaders typically hold. Additionally, the committee
approach divides the employee pool into separate factions, thereby eroding
the leverage that unions hold as the sole representative of employee interests.
After more than five years of state control, the State Board has elected
to reconstitute the school district;116 however, until the district meets the
State Board’s Level 5–Intensive Support exit criteria, the school district will
remain restricted from recognizing collective bargaining agents.117 Concerned district residents have challenged this decision in court.118 They posit
that to “reconstitute” does not include powers outside of making personnel
decisions before returning the reigns to the Local Board.119 The state legislature repealed the constrained statutory definition of “reconstitute” supporting this position, resulting in ambiguity.120 According to the State Board,
reconstitution is not defined in applicable state law.121 Plaintiffs, however,
contend that the Arkansas Department of Education’s lawyers should rely
on a definition of reconstitution that appears elsewhere in state law.122 According to that definition, “reconstitution” is confined to removing and replacing a district superintendent or removing and replacing a school
board.123
If the State Board reauthorizes the school board to recognize collective
bargaining agreements, the school board will almost assuredly do so, given
that a majority of the newly elected members were endorsed by the
LREA.124 However, given the aforementioned statutory changes, the LRSD
may be restrained in its collective bargaining agreement due to significant
115. ARK. CODE ANN. § 6-17-205 (West 2021).
116. See id. § 6-15-2917(c)(1).
117. Howell, supra note 8.
118. See Petition for Declaratory Judgment & for Issuance of a Writ of Mandamus, Speyer-Rainbolt v. Key, No. 60 CV-20-2396 (Mar. 27, 2020) [hereinafter Speyer-Rainbolt v. Key
Petition].
119. Id. at ¶¶ 18, 20, 25, 26, 32, 34–40.
120. Act of Aug. 1, 2017, No. 930, § 1, 2017 Ark. Acts 1 (codified at ARK. CODE. ANN. §
6-15-401–2918).
121. Motion to Stay, Pending Resolution of Separate Related Litig. & Inc. Brief in Support of the Motion to Stay, Speyer-Rainbolt v. Key, No. 60 CV-20-2396 (Oct. 20, 2020).
122. Speyer-Rainbolt v. Key Petition, supra note 118, ¶ 20.
123. Id.
124. See generally Cynthia Howell, In First Little Rock School Board Election Since
2014, 7 Slots Filled, 2 Run-offs Set, ARK. DEMOCRAT GAZETTE (Nov. 4, 2020, 12:49 AM),
https://www.arkansasonline.com/news/2020/nov/04/first-little-rock-school-board-election2014-7-slo/.
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statutory amendments in 2019 that require schools to implement the personnel policy committees.
The legislature removed the statutory language explicitly referencing a
school district’s agency to enter into collective bargaining agreements with
teachers’ unions.125 Specifically, by striking the following language from
Ark. Code Ann. § 6-17-202, the legislature extended statewide personnel
policies to cover school districts that recognize teachers’ unions as a bargaining agent:
The provisions of this subchapter shall not apply in any school district
which [sic] chooses to officially recognize in its policies an organization
representing the majority of the teachers of the school district for the
purpose of negotiating personnel policies, salaries, and educational matters of mutual concern under a written policy agreement. 126

Removing this provision demonstrates the legislature’s effort to subvert
local flexibility in its terms of employment with teachers’ unions. With this
legislation, collective bargaining agreements may now be preempted by
state personnel policies. The intent to reign in union power is obvious, given
the anti-union sentiment of the bill’s sponsor, Senator Bob Ballinger, who
has referred to union supporters as “thugs” and “bullies who don’t care
about children.”127
With this statutory amendment, there is uncertainty as to whether future collective bargaining agreements will be meaningful at all, considering
the state can simply enact top-down personnel policies that apply to previously exempt school districts that recognize teachers’ unions. The bill even
goes so far as permitting school districts to take actions that interfere with
teacher efforts to “have an organization represent a majority of the teachers[,]” instead preventing only actions that interfere with their right to “join
a professional organization.”128
The statutory changes restrict school districts’ relationship with unions
and remove references to a local school district’s ability to shape their interactions with unions. It is unclear whether the LREA and LRSD will be able
to engage in collective bargaining agreements once again without the state
contesting the revised statutory language that limits their ability to do so.
Given this significant uncertainty, it is essential for all interested parties to reevaluate policy judgments regarding the proper role of teachers’
unions in determining conditions of employment and policy matters. Before
Arkansas continues in line with other states’ efforts to retract union influ125. S.B. 392, 92nd Gen. Assemb. Reg. Sess (Ark. 2019) (enacted) [hereinafter S.B. 392].
126. Id.
127. Senator Bob Ballinger (@Bob_Ballinger), TWITTER (Nov. 14, 2019, 11:57 AM),
https://twitter.com/bob_ballinger/status/1195038018312298497?lang=en.
128. S.B. 392, supra note 125.
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ence,129 it would be prudent to consider whether this approach of ostracizing
teachers by diminishing their democratically elected representative actually
benefits the educational enterprise. In the following Sections, this Note argues that inclusion, not exclusion, is the proper policy moving forward and
proceeds to offer a legal framework for promoting collaboration between
teachers and management.
IV.

THE COMPATIBILITY OF UNION EMPLOYMENT INTERESTS AND
EDUCATIONAL OUTCOMES

Educational policy implicates a complex web of parties with various
interests, some mutually exclusive and others overlapping, in the broader
effect of those policies. This Note does not seek to untangle that web or establish a hierarchy, but instead, it identifies the landscape educational policy
must navigate. Assuming that the reform efforts targeting collective bargaining are not rooted in a general animus against organized labor and the protections afforded to them, these policies are grounded in the belief that union
interests are not aligned with those of children or of the State.130 An interestbased analysis is essential for determining the proper role of collective bargaining with teachers’ unions.131 This Section presents the inherent tensions
between teacher employment interests and other parties to the public school
system and reconciles some of these interests. It argues that while teachers’
and students’ interests do not always align, the same can be said for school
management collectively, whether school board members, administrators, or
policymakers. Establishing this value framework is necessary to move forward with policy proposals on teacher inclusion in the education policy decision-making process.
A.

The Interests Inherent to Educational Policy

The public has an aggregate interest in achieving strong educational
outcomes across the socioeconomic spectrum. In the past two decades, this
public concern has manifested itself in efforts to improve student performance metrics, the most important of which is standardized testing.132 Regardless of the merits of standardized testing, the notion that the public benefits from a more knowledgeable, skilled, and socialized citizenry is the

129. See supra Section II.B.
130. Koski, supra note 61, at 77.
131. See id. (introducing a framework from which workable solutions can be evaluated
given the deeply polarizing issue of teachers’ unions).
132. Id.
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American education system’s bedrock.133 Underlying these interests in the
outcome, however, are less tangible factors contributing to outcome metrics
such as a safe school environment, stability in a school’s rank-and-file,
teacher quality, and dynamic learning environments that foster creativity,
problem-solving, critical thinking, and social cohesion.134 Undoubtedly,
teacher quality plays an outsized role in these interests.
The public at large and the State, however, must balance these interests
with fiscal efficiency.135 Public education is generally a state’s top priority,
as reflected in the budget, and teacher compensation is the largest item of
spending for most school districts.136 Research indicates that teachers who
are afforded collective bargaining rights enjoy higher salaries.137 Whether
teachers are overpaid or not is outside the scope of this Note; however, for
administrators navigating budgetary restrictions, increasing teacher pay
could be a concern.
School management seeks strong educational outcomes but overriding
budget concerns are a limit that lies squarely on its shoulders. Flexibility and
discretion are touted as essential to achieving administrative goals, contravening union interests in limiting arbitrary decision-making relating to
teaching assignments, discipline, and benefits.138 Importantly, administrators
are not infallible and an ad hoc approach does not necessarily support better
educational outcomes.139 While administrators are more in tune with the
fiscal realities of school district management and educational policy, they
are not always more qualified than teachers on pedagogy and lack the personal insights into students that teachers develop in the classroom.
School management and teachers’ unions’ interests are not always
transparent, as both public officials and teachers’ unions have broader interests contrary to the public good, such as re-election, career advancement,

133. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) (“Today, education is perhaps the
most important function of state and local governments. Compulsory school attendance laws
and the great expenditures for education both demonstrate our recognition of the importance
of education to our democratic society. It is required in the performance of our most basic
public responsibilities, even service in the armed forces. It is the very foundation of good
citizenship. Today it is a principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in
preparing him for later professional training, and in helping him to adjust normally to his
environment. In these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education. Such an opportunity, where the
state has undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be made available to all on equal
terms.”).
134. Koski, supra note 61, at 77.
135. Id. at 78.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Lindy, supra note 40, at 1140.
139. Koski, supra note 61, at 79.
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private notions of lifestyle, and financial well-being, respectively.140 Therefore, union officials calling for increased pay at the behest of teachers’ unions or, conversely, singular opposition to tax increases, even to the detriment of the education budget, does not necessarily reflect good educational
policy.
Critics of teachers’ unions often go so far as asserting that union leadership does not act in the interests of its own members but rather represents
a bureaucratic force distinct from its membership.141 However, this view
does not carry water. Survey data reveals that teachers “(1) like their local
unions, (2) support collective bargaining, (3) believe that collective bargaining does not harm public education, and (4) support the core missions of
unions, including job security, higher salaries, and better working conditions.”142 If teacher sentiment was to turn against union leaders, they would
simply be voted out of office. Therefore, unions overwhelmingly reflect
teachers’ interests. And there is nothing untoward about teachers organizing
themselves to advocate for their interests. This is the norm in policy discussions, such as when wealthy citizens organize to block redistributive school
finance schemes143 or break away from an existing school district.144 Professionally, bar associations and medical associations around the country are
extremely influential, not to mention the myriad of industrial groups and
lobbyists that advocate for favorable policy decisions. Teachers, however,
have a leverage problem. A threat of striking to gain favorable employment
terms implicates the well-being of children. Thus, strikes often result in
harsh condemnation. But given the role of the profession, this outcome is
simply the reality of a free market at work.
Teaching, as a profession, though not a monolith, also has a more sympathy-evoking interest in student achievement and imparting social values to
students.145 This is not insignificant and may be likened to an attorney’s
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 80.
143. See, e.g., Hadley Barndollar, Portsmouth Fears NH Return to ‘Donor Town’ Education Funding, PORTSMOUTH HERALD (Jan. 16, 2021, 12:16 PM), https://www.seacoastonline.
com/story/news/education/2021/01/16/portsmouth-fears-return-donor-town-educationfunding-nh/6630453002/.
144. See, e.g., Kendi A. Rainwater, Signal Mountain to Consider Forming Own School
District, CHATTANOOGA TIMES FREE PRESS (Dec. 1, 2016), https://www.timesfreepress.com/
news/local/story/2016/dec/01/signal-mountain-residents-consider-forming-own-schooldistrict-breaking-away-hamilton-county-schools/400676/.
145. The two largest national teachers’ unions in the country formally recognize teachers’
obligation to work towards student success. See Mission, AM. FED’N FOR TEACHERS,
https://www.aft.org/about/mission (last visited Sept. 21, 2021); NEA, Code of Ethics for
Educators, NAT’L EDUC. ASS’N (Sept. 14, 2020), https://www.nea.org/resource-library/codeethics-educators.
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supposed interest in promoting values of justice in our legal system. While
certainly present and not easily discounted, the reality is that when these
broader interests clash with narrower economic interests, the latter prevails
more often than not.
Overall, schools must balance dueling public interests in fiscal responsibility and strong educational outcomes. The issue is that the further each
party is removed from the classroom, the more sympathetic each becomes to
the interests in administrative ease and budgetary restrictions to the detriment of the classroom. School management’s policy choices are not immune
from politics. Simply put, “it seems odd to burden [teachers’ unions] whose
interests may not always be aligned with children, yet permit others unfettered advocacy.”146
B.

Aligning Interests

To many, teacher interests and public interests are simply too divergent
for teachers to participate in the decision-making process without undermining policy objectives directed towards student interests.147 Critiques of the
collective bargaining process are grounded in a few common principles.
Primarily, it is asserted that unions hinder effective administration, which
requires a degree of flexibility that collectively bargained terms restrict.148
Removing poor performers, discretionary hiring, and incentivizing teacher
performance is all made extremely difficult, if not impossible.149 The administrative tight-rope is said to have a deleterious effect on school finances as
well, as bloated teacher salaries, typically based on seniority, reduce direct
spending on students.150
Critics also posit that collective bargaining incentivizes unions to distort the democratic process by exercising outsized influence at the polls.151
Teachers’ unions are an extremely powerful political force, especially at the
local level.152 Elected school board members are often thrust into that position behind an endorsement from their respective teacher’s union.153 There146. Koski, supra note 61, at 81.
147. See Dagostino, supra note 17, at 185–98.
148. Lindy, supra note 40, at 1140.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. See Dagostino, supra note 17, at 181–83.
152. See Lauren FitzPatrick & Nader Issa, Chicago Teachers Union Inc.: How the CloutHeavy Labor Group Spends its Money, CHICAGO SUN TIMES (Jan. 17, 2020, 4:00 PM),
https://chicago.suntimes.com/2020/1/17/21071027/chicago-teachers-union-ctu-spendinglabor (noting that the Chicago Teachers Union spent nearly $1.5 million on lobbying and
political activity from March 2018 to July 2019).
153. See Cynthia Howell, Callaway, Hatter Win Runoffs for Little Rock School Board,
ARK. DEMOCRAT GAZETTE (Dec. 1, 2020, 11:12 PM), https://www.arkansasonline.com/
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fore, school administrators’ bargaining position may be skewed and not necessarily reflect the educational priorities of the public and students. As a
result, teachers’ unions may advance teachers’ self-interests unchecked by
democratic institutions charged with oversight of school, to the detriment of
other interests.
While these arguments are not without merit, they defer to administrative judgment on what is good for the classroom. It assumes that decisions
strictly made by management, unfettered by union input, would represent
the optimum policy outcome for the public. This is a flawed position. Administrators are removed from the classroom environment. Instead, the administrative focus is directed towards budget concerns and performance
metrics.154 It is very possible that these interests could be pursued to the detriment of students.155 For example, unilateral administrative decisions to
reduce lesson plan preparation time, increase class size, or implement mandatory morning or lunch duty requirements may result in a less prepared or
fatigued teacher.156 This class-size example further illustrates how the various interests intersect:
. . . teachers have an interest in reducing their student workloads, students and parents routinely prefer the attention of small class sizes, but
small class size means more teachers and more money, so administrators
and districts would prefer to keep those class sizes large without compromising student learning. Which leads to the thorny empirical questions of whether small class sizes improve student outcomes. 157

This inquiry is easier stated than applied, but it does demonstrate that
union and teachers’ interests in the amalgam of matters that are subject to
collective bargaining are not opposed to strong educational outcomes per se.
Therefore, diminishing teachers’ seat at the table when it comes to these
issues is shortsighted.

news/2020/dec/01/callaway-hatter-win-runoffs-little-rock-school-boa/ (noting victors of
closely contested runoff elections for school board seats in Zone 3 and Zone 6 of the LRSD
were backed by the LREA).
154. See, e.g., ARK. CODE. ANN. § 6-13-620 (2021) (outlining the powers and duties of
school boards, including overseeing district finances, facility management, and adhering to
federal education laws).
155. See generally Meredith Broussard, Why Poor Schools Can’t Win at Standardized
Testing, ATLANTIC (July 15, 2014), https://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/
2014/07/why-poor-schools-cant-win-at-standardized-testing/374287/ (reporting on the dubious nature of standardized test results).
156. See Eileen G. Merritt, Time for Teacher Learning, Planning Critical for School
Reform, PHI DELTA KAPPAN (Dec. 1, 2016), https://kappanonline.org/time-teacher-learningplanning-critical-school-reform/.
157. Koski, supra note 61, at 81.
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Additionally, critics of collective bargaining do not address the adverse
consequences of denying a democratically supported collective bargaining
agent a seat at the table. Doing so creates significant malcontent among employee ranks.158 There is no alternative process for teachers to exert a binding influence on educational policy or narrow employment interests, for that
matter.159 This is an absurd consequence given the unique nature of the
teaching profession and discounts the potential contribution teachers’ expertise could have. Rejecting popular initiatives, in effect, implies that teachers’
voices are not relevant to the decision-making process.
It is intuitive that holding employees in such low esteem fosters cynicism and disinterest. Management practices furthering these sentiments
should be discouraged. However, the opposite is currently occurring in the
LRSD.160 It is apparent that the current adversarial path regularly results in
polarization and withdrawal. The Arkansas legislature must consider a new
way forward.
V.

AN ALTERNATIVE MODEL: PROFESSIONAL UNIONISM

This Section offers an approach to labor-management relations that
seizes upon mutual interests. To counter the negative impacts commensurate
with stripping teachers’ unions of collective bargaining power, it offers a
concept of professional unionism that promotes teacher engagement and
collaboration while not deferring entirely to teacher interests. The Arkansas
legislature should seize upon this model and introduce legislation that expressly protects school districts’ ability to recognize teachers’ unions rather
than following its current restrictive trajectory.
A.

The Paradox of Suppressing Union Bargaining Power

Public sector unions at large, not just teachers’ unions, have been targeted as undemocratic and impeding effective government.161 Diminishing
unions’ institutional voices, however, results in unions hardening their opposition to unfavorable decisions implemented by management.162 Union
exclusion does not necessarily result in a more streamlined decision-making
process because the union itself may still exist. Unilateral decision-making,
158. See, e.g., Howell, supra note 108 (reporting on response from LRSD teachers after
the State Board voted to not recognize the LREA).
159. Lindy, supra note 40, at 1140.
160. See infra Section III.
161. Martin H. Malin, Does Public Employee Collective Bargaining Distort Democracy?
A Perspective From the United States, 34 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 277, 289 (2013).
162. Martin H. Malin, The Paradox of Public Sector Labor Law, 84 IND. L.J. 1369, 1370
(2009).
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on the contrary, hardens union resolve to use whatever tools are available,
such as impact bargaining,163 to insulate themselves from potential adverse
effects on membership that any decision may invite. Others have labeled
this the “paradox theory” of public sector labor law.164 This anti-productive
outcome is a product of the industrial-labor relations model of collective
bargaining that has taken root in education.165 By characterizing every matter as either reserved for unilateral management control or subject to mandatory negotiation, no room is left for collaborative input by the employees.166
Applied to teachers’ unions specifically, the paradox theory aptly characterizes the deleterious effects of narrowing the scope of collective bargaining or prohibiting it all together. Without a meaningful stake in educational
policy decisions, teachers are removed from the risks of the educational enterprise and strictly focus on the “bread-and-butter” issues of employee benefits.167 This strictly self-serving bargaining position results in a focused
effort to stymie reform, undercutting the time and effort necessary for actual
implementation. Therefore, a legal structure that encourages collaboration
rather than union exclusion is essential.
Recent events in the LRSD may illustrate the deleterious effect of union exclusion. Just like all school districts around the country, the LRSD
was confronted with reopening schools for the Fall 2020 semester in the
midst of the COVID-19 pandemic.168 As early as June 5, 2020, the Arkansas
Department of Education Secretary Johnny Key released guidance that required school districts to provide in-person instruction five days a week
once the summer vacation concluded.169 The guidance generally charted the
163. Id. at 1390; Sch. Dist. of Indian River Cty. v. Fla. Pub. Employees Rels. Commn.,
64 So. 3d 723, 728–29 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011) (defining impact bargaining as negotiations
on a subject that reflects a managerial prerogative but may impact the terms or conditions of
employment within the scope of bargaining).
164. Malin, supra note 162, at 1391.
165. Id. at 1390.
166. Id.
167. See Superfine & Gottlieb, supra note 34, at 743. (“[u]nions and school districts are
incentivized to bargain in a way that foregrounds ‘bread and butter issues’ involving the
protection of teachers against the decisions of management. On a broader level, such collective bargaining laws weaken the possibility of robust teacher input into the design of teacher
evaluation, which is critical for a highly functioning school environment characterized by
collaboration and professional activity.”).
168. See generally School Responses to the Coronavirus (COVID-19) Pandemic During
the 2020-2021 Academic Year, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/School_responses_to_
the_coronavirus_(COVID-19)_pandemic_during_the_2020-2021_academic_year (cataloguing individual states’ responses to the challenges of reopening schools in the midst of the
pandemic).
169. See Cynthia Howell, State Tells Schools to Prepare Blend of In-Person, Online
Education, ARK. DEMOCRAT GAZETTE (June 5, 2020), https://www.arkansasonline.com/news/
2020/jun/05/state-tells-schools-to-prepare-blend-of/.
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sort of organization and stakeholder involvement that would be essential to
open schools back up with little mention of teacher input.170
The LREA opposed in-person teaching and voted to teach virtually only, citing the potential threat posed by exposure to the coronavirus.171 Only
limited guidance on protective health measures was available at the time. 172
In response, the LRSD strayed from its original plan of in-person-only instruction, adopting a phased re-entry schedule only five days before schools
reopened.173 The schedule allocated two in-person instruction days for students, designating days of the week by a student’s last name.174 The LREA
acquiesced to the governor’s compromise and reported to in-person duty,
but only one week later, the school district returned to a conventional school
schedule to the union’s consternation.175
The LREA quickly renewed its calls for remote learning, citing that
charter schools in the area had already taken that precaution.176 In a letter,
union spokesperson Theresa Knapp Gordon spoke harshly of the LRSD’s
approach to COVID-19, hinting that a strike was possible.177 With the State
as the sole proprietor of the decision-making process, there was no other
avenue for the teachers to use as leverage, despite the serious health risks.178
The union came close, as sixty-eight teachers performed a remote “teach-in”
from home, refusing to be onsite at the school as is required.179
In the midst of all this upheaval and back and forth between the union
and school district management, what resulted was uncertainty. Despite a
170. ARK. DEP’T. OF EDUC., ARKANSAS READY FOR LEARNING: PLANNING FOR REENGAGEMENT 4 (June 16, 2020), https://arsba.org/files/documents/Arkansas_Ready_
for_Learning_Final_6_17_20.pdf.
171. Cynthia Howell, Little Rock School District Says It Will Phase in Re-Entry Schedule,
ARK. DEMOCRAT GAZETTE (Aug. 19, 2020, 6:12 PM), https://www.arkansasonline.com/
news/2020/aug/19/little-rock-school-district-will-phase-re-entry-sc/.
172. ARK. DEPT. OF EDUC., ARKANSAS READY FOR LEARNING: HEALTHY SCHOOL GUIDE 1
(June 16, 2020), https://dese.ade.arkansas.gov/Files/20201016163210_Return_to_School_
Guide_81220.pdf.
173. Cynthia Howell, On-site Schedule Decided by LRSD; Phased Reentry Ends After
Week, ARK. DEMOCRAT GAZETTE (Aug. 27, 2020, 7:14 AM), https://www.arkansasonline.
com/news/2020/aug/27/on-site-schedule-decided-by-lrsd/.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Cynthia Howell, Little Rock Educators Meet Over Safety Plan, ARK. DEMOCRAT
GAZETTE (Sept. 8, 2020, 7:23 AM), https://www.arkansasonline.com/news/2020/sep/08/
educators-meet-over-safety-plan/.
177. Id.
178. Dave Perozek, Teachers’ Dual Roles Doubling Their Work, ARK. DEMOCRAT
GAZETTE (Oct. 25, 2020, 4:15 AM), https://www.arkansasonline.com/news/2020/oct/25/
teachers-dual-roles-doubling-their-work/?news-arkansas.
179. Cynthia Howell, Teachers’ Reprimands Stick So Far, ARK. DEMOCRAT GAZETTE
(Nov. 15, 2020, 2:30 AM), https://www.arkansasonline.com/news/2020/nov/15/teachersreprimands-stick-so-far/.
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months-long window for management and the union to collaboratively find
some middle ground solutions that both benefitted the students and properly
acknowledged the risk teachers were taking in coronavirus exposure, plans
for school reopening changed dramatically only one week before the first
day of school was set to begin.180 Without a formal negotiation process,
management was in a defensive position after any decision was made or
plan adopted. A post hoc approach to addressing teacher concerns substantially increased the risk of widespread malcontent amongst the teachers and
came close to causing a strike.181 At the same time, it created an environment where decisions were seemingly made at random.
If, alternatively, both parties engaged with one another, a more comprehensive plan that appeased all parties could be more obtainable. Additionally, forcing the union to play an active role in policy formulation forces
the teachers to give hands-on attention to the merits of the policy rather than
strictly the hardships imposed on teachers.
Union opponents may attribute the above narrative to the union undermining managerial decisions in a difficult time. This Note does not seek to
parse the merits of that argument because the LREA is a persistent presence
in the LRSD and, absent indications that support among membership wains,
it will continue to zealously advocate for its members.
B.

Professional Unionism: Adopting a New Model

Collective bargaining does not have to operate as a zero-sum game as
is standard under the existing industrial labor relations model. Some education leaders have advocated for teachers’ unions to pivot towards a bargaining position that emphasizes student needs to the same degree as the needs
of its members.182 Teachers’ unions’ leadership itself has advocated for this
model. A network of thirty American Federation for Teachers and National
Education Association local union chapters, known as the Teacher Union
Reform Network, has organized to empower teachers to become the driving
force behind education reform and promote labor management collaboration.183

180. Cynthia Howell, Little Rock School District Says It Will Phase in Re-Entry Schedule,
ARK. DEMOCRAT GAZETTE (Aug. 19, 2020, 6:12 PM), https://www.arkansasonline.com/news/
2020/aug/19/little-rock-school-district-will-phase-re-entry-sc/.
181. Howell, supra note 169.
182. See Daniel F. Jacoby & Keith Nitta, The Bellevue Teachers Strike and Its Implications for the Future of Postindustrial Reform Unionism, 26 EDUC. POL’Y 533, 534 (2011).
183. TURN’s Mission, TEACHER UNION REFORM NETWORK (Sept. 21,2021),
https://www.turnweb.org/about/.

2021]

NOT WAITING FOR SUPERMAN

335

First and foremost, professional unionism promotes the idea of “joint
custody” of any reform efforts that a school district adopts.184 Under this
idea, in a major shift away from strictly focusing on the “bread and butter”
issues of its membership, the union assumes a partial stake in all policies
implemented by the school district, thereby expanding the scope of bargaining.185 This approach seeks to reconcile the adversarial approach to collective bargaining that generally defines teachers’ unions and promotes a collegial working environment focused on problem-solving rather than periodic
zero-sum negotiations.186 Finally, professional unionism provides that the
union approaches bargaining with the public interest on equal footing as
their own “bread-and-butter” interests.187 By adopting this model of management and union relations, the LRSD could navigate its way out of the
existing “paradox” created by excluding the teacher’s union from the decision-making process and foster an environment that values teachers and
encourages meaningful educational reform.
To adopt this model of professional unionism, an appropriate legal
foundation encouraging the model is essential.188 In Arkansas, a legal structure including subjects that are typically viewed as managerial prerogatives,
such as teacher evaluations, into the scope of bargaining would create the
right atmosphere for collaboration. Union opponents and management may
be hesitant to adopt this approach due to fears that union leadership only
uses this additional leverage to further obstruct the implementation of policy.189 However, conditioning union involvement on good-faith bargaining
would mitigate this risk.190 This is the legal framework New Hampshire has
adopted, and Arkansas should follow suit.191 There, courts have construed
teacher evaluations, a managerial prerogative, to be within the scope of collective bargaining.192 However, a state labor board decision altered the industrial-relations model by threatening to shut out unions if they overstepped their position during negotiations and attempted to reign in management’s use of a mutually-crafted procedure for teacher evaluations.193
Under this framework, unions may be shut out completely from the deci184. Superfine & Gottlieb, supra note 34, at 777.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Mark Paige, Applying the “Paradox” Theory: A Law and Policy Analysis of Collective Bargaining Rights and Teacher Evaluation Reform From Selected States, 2013 BYU
EDUC. & L.J. 21, 39 (2013).
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Ass’n of Portsmouth Teachers/NEA-NH v. Portsmouth Sch. Dist., No. E-0043-1,
Dec. No. 2008-025 (N.H. Pub. Emp. Lab. Rels. Bd. Feb 15, 2008).
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sion-making process if they overreach.194 Therefore, they are incentivized to
work with school district management closely. The Arkansas legislature
could enact a statute that similarly provides a platform for collaborative collective bargaining on many managerial matters that affects the terms and
conditions of employment. The following are examples of structures for the
State to model upon.
The Toledo City School District in Ohio has received widespread acclaim for its achievements in education.195 The school district is unique in its
use of peer-review rather than management-driven evaluations of teacher
performance.196 This is a stark contrast to the traditional system in which
school administrators unilaterally critique teachers and unions stand ready to
protect negative reviews from harming their members. Instead, the union
acts as an arbiter of professional standards more akin to a medical licensing
board. According to Professor Malin, “[a]ttrition rates for poor performers
tend to be higher under peer review than under traditional evaluation systems.”197
Additionally, the teacher’s union in Toledo collaborates with school
district administration to “select textbooks, develop curriculum, monitor and
implement school improvement plans, and . . . [establish] reading and math
academies to improve early literacy and computational skills.”198 The success of Toledo Public Schools demonstrates the merits of cooperation between the administration and teachers’ unions.
More conservative measures than Toledo’s wholesale adoption of managerial prerogatives into the scope of bargaining have also resulted in meaningful reform, and therefore Arkansas and the LRSD could take a more incremental approach to professional unionism. In Illinois, the state legislature
enacted the Performance Evaluation Reform Act in January 2010.199 The
statute created a commission where equal numbers of teachers and administrators collaborated to incorporate certain indicators of student growth into
teacher evaluation plans.200 The use of student growth factors in teacher
evaluation plans itself was not a subject of bargaining, but the collective
bargaining agreement called for a collaborative effort by teachers’ unions
and administrators.201 The Illinois legislature used this same model as an

194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
8655.
200.
201.

Id.
Malin, supra note 20, at 531.
Id.
Id. at 532.
Id. at 533.
Performance Evaluation Reform Act of 2010, Pub. Act 096-861, 2009 Ill. Laws
Id. § 24A-4.
Malin, supra note 20, at 531.
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innovative procedure for laying off teachers during a reduction in force.202
Under this statutory scheme, a joint labor-management committee may elevate certain teachers into a higher priority list for retention. Additionally,
committee members serve as watchdogs for targeting of certain subsets for
removal.203
Even this incremental approach shows a significant departure from the
adversarial approach that is typical of the labor-management industrial relations model. The U.S. Department of Education has praised this model as
something for other school districts to aspire towards.204
In addition to adopting a legal framework that expands the scope of
bargaining, the LRSD, and the LREA could adopt a mechanism known as
interest-based bargaining.205 Under this model, the collective bargaining
process is framed by the underlying merits of a particular issue and not the
individual interests of the bargaining parties.206 Interest-based bargaining
creates a neutral forum for the best possible solution to policy concerns.207
The process facilitates joint resolution of problems so that individual parties
are more vested in the results.208 The process could ensue as follows:
Management may bring to the table the issue of adopting or reforming
the district’s teacher evaluation process. Management and unions would
jointly establish objective criteria to measure possible solutions. Such
criteria might ask whether a proposed solution does any of the following:
(1) improves teacher effectiveness; (2) is fair to employees; or (3) provides necessary resources for both management and employees. Both
parties would brainstorm potential solutions that address the problem and
also can be measured against these criteria. Thus, management and unions, would constructively and positively address the problem.209

This is an idealistic outlook on the negotiation process, but it could
serve as an ideal to aspire to. By enacting a statute protecting collective bargaining with teachers’ unions, the Arkansas General Assembly could condi202. 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/24-12(c)(1)–(2) (2021).
203. Id. § 5/24-12(c)(5) (2021).
204. U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., SHARED RESPONSIBILITY: A U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION
WHITE PAPER ON LABOR-MANAGEMENT COLLABORATION, 12 (May 2012),
https://www2.ed.gov/documents/labor-management-collaboration/white-paper-labormanagement-collaboration.pdf.
205. Paige, supra note 188, at 41 (“[Interest based bargaining] focuses on building relationships through negotiations. It recognizes that parties to a negotiated agreement must live
and work under that agreement. Thus, the bargaining process should foster positive relationships between union and management. It stands in contrast to traditional ‘positional bargaining that can be hostile to education reform.’”).
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 41–42.
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tion collective bargaining upon an interest-based bargaining approach to
negotiations.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Teachers’ unions remain a stalwart in education despite being confronted by legislative efforts to subvert their influence, judicial decisions
that restrict compelling membership, and the prevalence of charter schools.
Working alongside teachers’ unions is absolutely essential to foster a school
system where reform efforts are not met by resistance at every corner. The
LRSD, though currently restricted in its ability to recognize the LREA as the
representative of school district employees, will have a unique opportunity
in coming years to set the tone for union relations once district control is
returned to the school board. The State of Arkansas must collectively recognize that legislation seeking to subvert union influence does more harm than
good and should pivot towards incorporating teachers’ unions into the decision-making process.
If the State of Arkansas continues its current trajectory, policy
measures will only be met by teachers’ unions threatening to strike. If our
civic institutions treat teachers like industrial labor, teachers’ unions will
follow suit and strictly make decisions out of self-interest and not for the
betterment of our schools.
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